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Introduction 
The Natal Afrikaner1 rebels hardly feature in the historiography of the Anglo-Boer 
War of 1899–1902. The Times History of the War in South Africa dismisses their 
rebellion in one sentence,2 while the Natal Mercury of 25 April 1900 correctly points 
out that the number of rebels and the scale of the rebellion are rather insignificant when 
compared with that of the Cape Colony. In the latter, where in contrast to Natal, 
Afrikaners formed the bulk of the white population, the dynamics of the rebellion was 
very different. The large number of Afrikaners resident in the Cape Colony acted as a 
magnet for the Republican forces and as a result, large numbers of Afrikaners took up 
arms against Britain. From their side, the British authorities acted with a vengeance 
towards the Cape rebels, executing and imprisoning large numbers.3 
While the rebellion in Natal, a region in which Afrikaners formed a significant 
minority amongst the white population, was much smaller in scale when compared to 
the Cape Colony it was nevertheless a war-related event of gigantic proportions for 
both the inhabitants of the Colony of Natal and the Natal Government. It was to spark 
                                                          
1. In this article, the term ‘Boer’ will be used to refer to citizens of the two Boer 
Republics and ‘Afrikaner’ to refer to Dutch-speaking British subjects resident in Natal 
and the Cape. This decision is based on the terms of description used by the bulk of the 
archival material consulted for this article. 
2. LS Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899–1902, Vol VI, 
p. 62.  
3. Natal Mercury, 25.4.1900. For a comprehensive overview of the legal treatment of 
rebels during the Anglo-Boer War in the Cape Colony, see JH Snyman, Rebelle-
verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog met spesiale verwysing na 
die militêre howe (1899–1902), passim. 
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debates about the kind of legal action that should be taken against the rebels and who 
should control the legal process. On the other hand, the British Army wanted to win the 
war against the two Boer Republics as speedily and with as little civilian interference as 
possible.  
This article explores the multifaceted relationship between the powerful British 
Army, which had the capacity and ability to impose and administer martial law, and 
Natal, one of the smallest colonies in the British Empire with its limited capacity to 
dispense law, but unfailing belief in its own jurisdiction. This spawned both conflict 
and compromise on the legal procedures to be followed in dealing with Natal Afrikaner 
rebels accused of high treason. As such, this article is a case study of the coexistence of 
both military and civilian law in a theatre of war.  
The initial legal reaction from the Natal Government and the British Army 
Although the involvement of Natal Afrikaners, as British subjects, in the Boer 
invasion of the Colony and the subsequent subjugation of the Klip River County4 in 
October 1899 did not catch the Natal Government totally by surprise, its legal and 
preventative measures were slow in coming and hardly adequate. Martial law was only 
declared in all of Natal on 23 October 1899, more than 10 days after war broke out 5 
with the purpose of acting as “the public law of self-defence (and) the right to use 
military means to preserve the peace against public enemies within”.6 Martial law gave 
the military authorities the power to use extreme measures to maintain safety and 
security. To achieve this, movement was restricted, passes were issued, people were 
arrested and removed from their farms, and property was commandeered.7 In Natal, 
martial law was initially upheld by the Indemnity Bill published on 5 June 1900 to 
protect “the Governor of the Colony, and the Officer Commanding her Majesty’s 
Forces in Natal, and all persons acting under their authority and in good faith in regard 
                                                          
4. The Klip River County covered the whole of Northern Natal and consisted of the 
following districts: Newcastle, Dundee, Umsinga, Ladysmith and parts of Upper 
Tugela. The vast majority of the white inhabitants of these districts were Afrikaners 
who were British subjects. The Boers occupied this area for 188 days. 
5. Pietermaritzburg Archive Repository (hereafter PAR), Government House (hereafter 
GH) 1454: Proclamation No. 108 extending martial law to all of Natal, Proviso B and 
Zululand, 23.10.1899; De Natal Afrikaner, 23.10.1899; Natal Witness, 24.10.1899. 
6. FN Wiener, Civilians under military justice. The practice since 1869 especially in 
North America, p. 219. 
7. PAR, Umsinga Magistrate (hereafter 1/UMS) 38: Pass issued to L Combrinck by T 
Maxwell, 18.9.1900; British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter Cd) 981: Papers relating 
to the administration of martial law in South Africa, 1902. 
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to acts during the existence of Martial Law”.8 This bill was subsequently updated by 
other Indemnity Bills as circumstances changed.9  
The Natal Government’s first reaction after war broke out was not the declaration 
of martial law. Instead, they swiftly issued several proclamations to suppress possible 
rebellion.10 Suspecting that the proclamations were being ignored, and disregarding the 
possibility that they may not have reached the people they were aimed at, the Natal 
authorities requested Attorney-General Henry Bale to prepare a draft proclamation that 
would allow the Natal Government to confiscate movable and immovable property of 
Natal Afrikaners who had been captured as prisoners-of-war (hereafter POWs) while 
fighting for the Boers, of those who died on the battlefield, and of the fathers who had 
sons on commando. In the proposed proclamation, the Governor of Natal, Sir Walter 
Hely-Hutchinson, prohibited the registrar of deeds to register the sale, transfer or 
mortgage of any of the properties registered in the names of Afrikaners in the above-
mentioned categories.11  
The possible confiscation of rebel property as a punitive measure for 
committing high treason was at this early stage also one of the legal avenues 
investigated by the military. An enquiry by General Sir Redvers Buller, the officer 
commanding the British Army in South Africa at the time, to the War Office in London 
about how severely he should deal with those guilty of treason, elicited the following 
answer: “they are not entitled to favourable consideration and should be punished 
severely.” This could include possible forfeiture of property and/or deportation.12  
Attorney-General Bale was, however, personally hesitant when it came to 
punishing high treason by property confiscation. Quoting from the Groot Placaat Boek, 
Vol 6, p. 577, published on 1 May 1732, he indicated that the Netherlands had 
abolished confiscation of property altogether in the case of treason. Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom, Acts 33 and 34 abolished the confiscation and forfeiture of property 
for the same crime. Bale, nonetheless, contextualised the abolishment of confiscation 
                                                          
8. Public Record Office – Kew, London (hereafter PRO), Colonial Office (hereafter 
CO) 179/211: Indemnity Bill as published on 5.6.1900. 
9. PAR, Prime Minister (hereafter PM) 34: Indemnity Bills, Act 41 of 1901 and Act 22 
of 1902. 
10. See, for example, PAR, Natal Colonial Publication (hereafter NCP) 6/1/1/52: 
Proclamation No. 106 issued by W Hely-Hutchinson, 15.10.1899; Natal Witness, 
16.10.1899. 
11. PAR, Colonial Secretary’s Office (hereafter CSO) 2581: Draft proclamation 
suggesting that it is the intention of the Natal Government to confiscate the property of 
rebellious Natal Afrikaners, 21.10.1899. 
12. PRO, War Office (hereafter WO) 1767: Telegrams exchanged between General R 
Buller and the War Office, 11.12.1899. 
 80 
by stating that this did not apply to the property of rebels taken in the course of 
hostilities that would, under International Law, belong to the government.13  
Despite the opinion of the Attorney-General, the Natal Government forged ahead 
with proposed legislation to sanction the official confiscation of property as a 
punishment for treasonable offences.14 Such thinking did not find favour with the 
Colonial Office or Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, who asked for the opinion 
of the Law Officers’ Department at the Royal Courts of Justice. Their report echoed the 
opinion earlier expressed by Attorney-General Bale, namely that neither under Roman 
Dutch Law nor under International Law could the Natal Government be justified in 
confiscating landed property for the crime of high treason. It would also be contrary to 
the principles of justice to pass a law that would sanction retrospective action for the 
purpose of inflicting such punishment. Suspected rebels could, however, be tried by 
martial law or treated as POWs. After the conclusion of the war, such rebels could then 
be tried for treason.15 The Natal Prime Minister, Albert Hime, responded by 
immediately abandoning the idea of property confiscation by declaring, “It is not the 
intention of the Government to introduce a bill to provide for confiscation as it is not 
one of the punishments recognised by the Law of this Colony or of England.”16 
At the same time as property confiscation was rejected as a sentence for high 
treason the death penalty as a form of punishment came under the spotlight. Attorney-
General Bale noted, “the principal punishment (for high treason) is doubtless that of 
death.” He nevertheless argued against this because he viewed the death penalty to be 
very similar to confiscation. Bale therefore reasoned that a fine might be imposed as the 
punishment for high treason. However, he was quick to point out that fines were not 
the only way to punish treason and that the “primary punishment” was still death or 
imprisonment.17 Nonetheless what Bale did was, from the perspective of the Natal 
Government, to effectively remove the death penalty early on from the agenda as a 
punitive measure for high treason. 
Where then did the Natal Government, roughly three months after the Boer 
invasion of Natal, stand on the punishment of high treason? Martial law had been 
declared, proclamations warning against treason were issued, the death penalty was 
frowned upon and the confiscation of property was rejected. However, no real legal 
                                                          
13. PAR, Zululand Administration (hereafter ZA) 33: The opinion of H Bale on the 
crime of high treason, 1899–1900. 
14. PAR, GH 1445: Minute paper W Hely-Hutchinson to AH Hime, 21.11.1899. 
15. PAR, CO 179/216: Opinion on the confiscation of the property of rebels, 
25.1.1900. 
16. PAR, PM 17: Response to the question of confiscation posed by Yonge, 1.6.1900. 
17. PAR, ZA 33: The opinion of H Bale on the crime of high treason, 1899–1900. 
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suggestions on how to deal with the suspected rebels were forthcoming. One of the 
reasons for this was that Natal possessed a comprehensive treason law, Law No. 3 of 
1868. This legislation was in line with the law of the United Kingdom pertaining to 
treasonable offences and contained an extensive definition of high treason, namely 
“overt acts or deeds” as well as treasonable acts by publishing or “open and advised 
speaking” of traitorous “compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or 
intentions”.18 Law No. 3 of 1868, however, made no provision for the confiscation of 
the landed property of those found guilty of treason. When reviewing this law in 
August 1899, the Natal Legislative Assembly rejected the idea to amend it to allow for 
the confiscation of property.19 All in all, Law No. 3 of 1868 lacked real judicial power 
to deal with high treason within a context vastly different from when it had been passed 
31 years before. Little wonder then that the magistrate for Ladysmith stated in his 1900 
report,  
I am of opinion that it would have been a kindness to these people had 
there been a stringent Rebellion Act in force; many would have 
hesitated to join the enemy had such an action jeopardised the safety of 
their landed property.20  
Like the Natal Government, the British Army was unsure on how to deal with the 
suspected Natal rebels legally. The idea emanating from the Provost-Marshal’s Office, 
based on the Roman Dutch Law by Van der Linden, was that the punishment for high 
treason “… is generally Death, and the manner and mode of execution is generally 
according to the greater or less degree of aggravating circumstances”.21 A circular 
memorandum, issued by General Lord Kitchener on behalf of the officer commanding 
of the British Army, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, however, provided greater clarity 
from the perspective of the military. It urged all involved in investigating treasonable 
charges to guard against political and personal bias and not to exhibit a feeling of 
sympathy or to sell articles to the Boer commandoes. Treasonable offences which were 
to be verified by impartial witnesses included preaching sedition and advising 
inhabitants to take up arms, giving information on troop movements, carrying arms 
against the British Army, and, more specifically, taking part in an attack on the British 
forces.22 The argument that the Boers had annexed a certain district and that the 
                                                          
18. PAR, NCP 7/1/14: Natal Government Gazette, 22.9.1868. 
19. Natal Legislative Assembly Debates, 22.8.1899. 
20. PAR, NCP 8/1/11/3/2: Annual report Magistrate Klip River District, 1900. 
21. National Archives Repository – Pretoria (hereafter NAR), Provost Marshal’s Office 
(hereafter PMO) 2: Extract from Roman Dutch Law, p. 202, by Van der Linden, 
certified by Lt-Col NM Poole, no date. 
22. PAR, CSO 2591: Circular memorandum issued by Lord Kitchener, 3.2.1900.  
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inhabitants were forced to enlist were not to be accepted as a valid reason for 
committing treason.23 In contrast to the view of Attorney-General Bale, the 
memorandum deemed that, in exceptional cases, the commanding officer could, after a 
preliminary investigation, impose a death penalty. Under such circumstances, he had to 
apply for instructions from the commander-in-chief to arrange a trial for the offender 
before a commission existing of a judge of the Supreme Court and four commissioned 
officers.24  
The military practically applied the memorandum issued by Kitchener at the first 
possible opportunity. MP and GW de Jager, both Republican burghers, of 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban respectively, became the first two men to be sentenced for 
high treason under martial law by a Military Court in Natal. MP de Jager was originally 
arrested by a column under Brigadier-General JH Yule between Dundee and Ladysmith 
and imprisoned in Ladysmith during the siege, before being ordered to remain in 
Pietermaritzburg. A second attempt to reach the Boer lines, which involved crossing 
the Tugela River, failed as the De Jager’s were arrested by African scouts and handed 
over to the military.25 Both were found guilty of breaching martial law and for 
attempting to enlist with the enemy. A Military Court under Maj-Gen Wolfe-Murray 
sentenced them to six months’ imprisonment and a fine of £50 each, or a further one 
month imprisonment.26  
At this stage, roughly six months into the war, with the Boer commandoes still in 
control of most of Northern Natal, a legal impasse of sorts existed. While the British 
Army and the Natal Government generally had the same idea regarding high treason 
and believed that confiscation was not a viable alternative, only the military had a legal 
structure – martial law supported by a memorandum issued by the officer commanding 
– in place. Apart from proposing a threatening proclamation and proclaiming martial 
law, not much legal progress was made by the Natal Government on how to deal with 
the suspected rebels.  
                                                          
23. Compulsion and lack of protection from the Natal authorities were the standard 
defence offered by many Natal Rebels. See OE Prozesky private collection, Diary of 
JJA Prozesky: Diary entry, 6.2 1901. 
24. PAR, CSO 2591: Circular memorandum issued by Lord Kitchener, 3.2.1900.  
25. PAR, Attorney-General’s Office (hereafter AGO) 1/8/70: Papers relating to the 
arrest of MP and GW de Jager, 7.5.1900–12.5.1900. 
26. PRO, WO 108/302: Extracts from the proceedings of the Military Court in Natal, 
1900; PAR, PM 87: Sentences imposed by the Military Court on MP and GW de Jager, 
29.6.1900–2.7.100. 
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The offensive of the British Army in Natal and the immediate results thereof 
On 11 May 1900, the British Army, under General Sir Buller, launched an 
operation with the aim of clearing the Klip River County from Boer commandoes. The 
arrest and prosecution of rebels was only a secondary military objective of this planned 
advance. Two months earlier, Buller had even expressed some sympathy with the 
rebels’ plight and felt that “they really seem to have been more sinned against than 
sinning.”27 Buller, whose sentiments were probably coloured by previous positive 
dealings with Natal Afrikaners during the Anglo-Zulu and Anglo-Transvaal Wars 
twenty years earlier, informed Governor Hely-Hutchinson in a telegram dated 11 
March 1900 of his views on how the suspected rebels should be treated. He suggested 
that they should be allowed to go back to their farms and that the Natal Government 
should treat them as suspects and have the police investigate them. Only once a case 
was built against them should they be arrested. At the same time he abdicated military 
involvement in dealing with the suspected rebels because he had neither the men nor 
the time to perform the required duties. The Natal authorities accepted these 
recommendations and instructed the Natal Police, from their bases outside the Boer 
occupied area, to intensify the preliminary gathering of information against suspected 
rebels.28 
On 1 May 1900, 10 days before the British Army advanced northwards, Buller 
announced his policy regarding the suspected Natal rebels. In his proclamation he 
stated that some of the Natal Afrikaners were misled into taking up arms, and having 
realised their error they were keen to redeem themselves. If they did do so, by laying 
down their weapons, he undertook to present their cases to the Natal authorities for 
more “considerate treatment” than extended to those who chose to remain in the field.29 
The contents of Buller’s proclamation infuriated the Natal Government who felt that he 
“had no business issuing such a proclamation without consulting the Governor of 
Natal”. The second part, which promised “considerate treatment” especially, displeased 
the Natal Government for it bound them against their will. The government, possibly 
for the sake of diplomacy and to avoid conflict, did not confront Buller about his 
proclamation.30  
When the British Army finally advanced from Ladysmith via Helpmekaar to 
                                                          
27. PAR, PM 17: Telegram General R Buller to W Hely-Hutchinson, 17.5.1900.  
28. PAR, CSO 2587: Telegram General R Buller to W Hely-Hutchinson, 11.3.1900.  
29. PAR, GH 532: Proclamation issued by General R Buller, 11.5.1900; De Natal 
Afrikaner, 15.5.1900. 
30. PRO, CO 179/212: Minute paper regarding the proclamation of General R Buller, 
1.5.1900–13.6.1900. 
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Dundee, several suspected rebels were arrested as the Boer commandoes retreated, 
principally by the advance parties of the Natal Carbineers. These arrests soon spread to 
Dannhauser and Newcastle. Some suspected rebels, like TR Boshoff and JJ Nel, 
possibly reacting to Buller’s proclamation, surrendered of their own accord31 and 
received passes that allowed them to return to their farms.32 In the wake of these 
advance parties came the major body of the British Army, which swept the Klip River 
County clean of its Afrikaner residents. Between 10 May and early June 1900, 166 
suspected rebels either surrendered or were arrested by the army.33 As a result of this 
campaign in which the military did police work, only one person, John Torpey, was 
found guilty of treason and convicted under martial law by a Military Court. Torpey, an 
English-speaking Newcastle trader who had formerly resided in the Orange Free State 
for 20 years, had done a roaring trade with the Boers during their occupation of 
Northern Natal. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour and a 
fine of £100 or a further year imprisonment.34 No Natal Afrikaners were, however, 
tried. They were shrewdly left for the civilian authorities to deal with. 
Before long the prisons in Dundee and Newcastle found it impossible to hold all 
the suspected rebels, and between 30 May and 7 June 1900 a total of 74 were 
transferred to the central prison in Pietermaritzburg. Once Pietermaritzburg could no 
longer accommodate all of them, some were imprisoned on board the Catalonia outside 
the Durban harbour.35 The reasons offered by the military for transferring the suspected 
rebels included the dangers of having so many prisoners close to the front, the crowded 
nature of the local prisons, and the anticipation of further arrests and surrenders.36 All 
these measures, however, proved insufficient because of the sheer number of suspects 
arrested by or surrendering to the army. Consequently, some were allowed to reside in 
Newcastle with family members, in the local hotel, or in the vestry of the Newcastle 
Dutch Reformed Church on condition that they reported to the police twice a day.37  
On arriving in Newcastle, Buller, true to his declaration of 11 March 1900,38 that 
the civil authorities had to be empowered to deal with the suspected rebels, requested 
                                                          
31. Natal Witness, 6.6.1900. 
32. Natal Witness, 25.5.1900. 
33. PAR, AGO I/8/75: Disposal of treason cases in Natal, 10.10.1899–4.8.1900. 
34. PAR, GH 502: Correspondence pertaining to the request by J Torpey for remission 
of sentence, 17.6.1901–24.7.1901; De Natal Afrikaner, 5.6.1900. 
35. PAR, AGO I/7/46: Lists of Natal rebels captured from 10.5.1900–4.6.1900, 
compiled by Lt-Col AE Sandbach. 
36. PAR, AGO I/8/70: Letter GL Fraser to H Bale, 2.6.1900. 
37. OE Prozesky private collection, Diary of JJA Prozesky: Diary entries, 24.5.1900 
and 30.5.1900. 
38. PAR, CSO 2587: Telegram General R Buller to W Hely-Hutchinson, 11.3.1900.  
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that the magistrates and their staff be returned.39 By then Magistrates P Hugo of 
Dundee and JO Jackson of Newcastle, both in exile in Southern Natal, were already, 
with the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Office (hereafter CIO), and based on 
the evidence of fellow exiles, busy compiling extensive lists of suspected rebels.40  
Once Northern Natal was cleared of Boer commandoes, the Natal Police became 
the driving force behind the initial investigations against suspected Natal rebels 
arrested by the military. By 11 June 1900, a list with the names of 212 suspected rebels 
from the Dundee District, as well as witnesses, to testify against them, was in place.41 
With the Klip River County cleared of Boers and suspected rebels, and the 
magistrates and the Natal Police busy with their investigations, Buller issued his final 
orders regarding the treatment of suspected rebels. These strategically timed and 
pragmatic orders decreed that all British subjects in the Klip River County would be 
required to register with the magistrates in their districts. On registration they had to 
sign either Declaration A or B. Declaration A was intended for those rebels suspected 
of taking up arms and such signatories were required to hand over their horses, arms, 
and ammunition and to sign a declaration stating, “I was forced by the Queen’s enemies 
to take up arms against Her Majesty’s Troops, and a rifle and ammunition were issued 
to me.” The suspects who fell in this category could proceed to their farms on condition 
that they could be summoned at a later stage. They were also not allowed to 
communicate with or assist the Boers.42 If they claimed that they had handed their rifles 
to the Boers they were imprisoned until it could be proven that there were no arms on 
their farms. Natal Afrikaners within this group would eventually stand trial as rebels. 
Declaration B applied to British subjects who were required to bring two trustworthy 
witnesses before a magistrate to prove that they had remained absolutely loyal.43  
Buller’s orders, like his proclamation of 1 May 1900,44 angered the Natal 
Government. This time around, with the military situation in the Colony under control, 
the Natal Government, by means of Attorney-General Bale, reacted confidently and 
confronted Buller complaining that the orders were in conflict with the Natal 
                                                          
39. PAR, PM 17: Telegram General R Buller to W Hely-Hutchinson, 17.5.1900. 
40. PAR, CSO 2588: Request to P Hugo and JO Jackson to compile lists of suspected 
rebels, 5.5.1900. 
41. PAR, AGO I/7/42: Letter Clarke to H Bale, 11.6.1900. 
42. PAR, AGO I/7/42: Declaration A and B as issued by the British Army, 25.5.1900. 
43. PAR, Ladysmith Magistrate (hereafter 1/LDS) 1/7/8: Orders General R Buller as 
relayed by Lt-Col AE Sandbach on the treatment of residents of Northern Natal, 
28.5.1900. 
44. PAR, GH 532: Proclamation issued by General R Buller, 11.5.1900; De Natal 
Afrikaner, 15.5.1900. 
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Government proclamations issued in October 1899. Bale was also concerned that the 
oath in which the suspected rebels declared that they were forced to take up arms by the 
enemies of the Queen, would serve to prejudice the prosecution and that it may even 
place the onus to disprove the statement upon the crown, for under normal judicial 
circumstances the onus was on the prisoner to prove that he was compelled to take up 
arms. Even though Buller was prepared to apologise if his “non-legal” mind had 
prejudiced the process, he still believed that the onus was on the suspected rebels to 
prove their innocence.45  
The fears of the Natal Government were, to a certain extent, allayed by Buller’s 
intelligence officer, Lt-Col AE Sandbach, who informed the suspected rebels who, in 
terms of Buller’s proclamation, were expecting to be released after handing in their 
weapons, that “each case must be considered on its merits and it is unadvisable on 
military grounds to release some of the suspected rebels on parole and the civil 
government must start the trials as soon as possible.”46  
This spat between the civil and military authorities on how to deal with the 
suspected Natal rebels was only the first of a series of such disagreements and served to 
highlight the differences in the organisational and legal cultures these two organisations 
represented.47 Especially the issue regarding the investigation of the suspected rebels 
initially arrested by the military, caused conflict. What made things even more difficult 
for the Natal Government was the fact that, under martial law, they were required to 
cooperate with the military in matters regarding the suspected rebels.48 Against this 
backdrop of simmering tension, the Natal authorities also had to deal with the pressure 
of another kind – the rabid and rampant jingoism amongst sectors of the Natal public, 
the English newspapers and certain organisations that insisted that a speedy justice be 
served on the suspected rebels. 
The Natal Government takes legal control 
The Times of Natal called upon all Natalians to gather as much evidence as 
                                                          
45. PAR, AGO I/8/71: Minute paper H Bale relative to the form of oath Natal rebels 
had to sign, 29.5.1900–1.6.1900.  
46. PAR, Dundee Magistrate (hereafter1/DUN) 3/1/8: Letter Lt-Col AE Sandbach to 
Provost Marshal, 15.6.1900.  
47. C Townshend, Martial Law: Legal and Administrative problems of civil emergency 
in Britain and the Empire, 1800–1940, The Historical Journal, 25/1, 1982, pp. 164-
194. 
48. VS Harris, The reluctant rebels: The impact of the Second Anglo-Boer War upon 
the Klip River Dutch community, with special reference to the Dutch community of 
Dundee, p. 44. 
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possible against suspected Natal rebels and to forward it to the government,49 while the 
Natal Advertiser heavily criticised the idea that rebel property could not be 
confiscated.50 At the same time all major English newspapers published in Natal carried 
numerous letters demanding severe punishment for all rebels.51 The debate on what to 
do with the rebels continued outside the columns of the newspapers with the Lower 
Tugela Division Association urging the Natal Government to bring “rebels and traitors 
to justice”.52 A similar call was forwarded on behalf of the Mid-Illovo Farmer’s Club.53 
These reactions and comments from the press and the public exerted enormous pressure 
on the Natal Government to not only to act decisively against the suspected rebels but 
also to exercise its authority and independence. 
In addition to the tide of public criticism, the Imperial authorities in London voiced 
their scepticism regarding the actions of the Natal Government concerning the 
suspected rebels. What they really worried about was the high treason legislation, Law 
No. 3 of 1868 that was endorsed in August 1899 by the Natal Legislative Assembly. 
They doubted whether the Natal authorities and the local courts, using a jury system, 
would be able to deal with the suspected rebels justly. The Imperial Government 
furthermore desired a reasonably similar treatment of rebels in Natal and the Cape 
Colony, and to this end an “Imperial Special Commission” to try the rebels in both the 
colonies was suggested.54 
At that stage, as a number of events unfolded concurrently, the Natal Government 
found itself in a pressure cooker situation – the Imperial authorities were distrusting 
their ability to deal fairly with the suspected rebels, the local voters and press were 
baying for blood, and they had to deal with the British Army who had arrested large 
numbers of suspected rebels and who had, under General Buller, steered the legislative 
process in a certain direction. 
For the Natal Government, unlike for the British Army and the Imperial authorities, 
much more was at stake than merely trying rebels. For them it was an opportunity to 
defend the autonomy gained less than a decade before, in 1893, when responsible 
government was bestowed on the Colony. The trials of the suspected rebels were the 
                                                          
49. Times of Natal as quoted by De Natal Afrikaner, 13.10.1899. 
50. Natal Advertiser, 7.6.1900. 
51. See, for example, the Natal Witness, Times of Natal, Natal Advertiser, 27.3.1900, 
29.3.1900, 31.3.1900 and 2.4.1900; PAR, PM 17: Letter WM Perry to AH Hime, 
3.4.1900. 
52. PAR, CSO 1644: Lower Tugela Division Association regarding the punishment of 
rebels, 4.4.1900. 
53. PAR, CSO 1643: Resolution by the Mid-Illovo Farmers’ Club, 19.4.1900. 
54. PRO, CO 179/211: Telegram W Hely-Hutchinson to J Chamberlain, 12.5.1900. 
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ideal opportunity to do this. The Natal Government was therefore determined to show 
its independence by dispensing justice on its subjects, and insisted that they would deal 
with the suspected rebels with a minimum “interference from the Imperial 
Government”. As a government, they firmly believed that the existing system of 
administration of justice in Natal was adequate for the trial of rebels and “that the 
appointment of a judicial commission would be construed as a reflection upon the 
impartiality of our tribunals”.55 The Natal Government also made it clear that it was not 
possible to treat rebels in Natal and the Cape Colony in a similar fashion since for, 
unlike some districts in the Cape Colony, no district in Natal had suffered a revolt from 
the majority of its inhabitants.56 Governor Hely-Hutchinson therefore informed 
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and High Commissioner Alfred Milner that 
“the circumstances in the Cape Colony and in Natal differ considerably and that to 
require uniformity of treatment of rebels would not be advisable.”57  
The Natal Government was, however, not united in its point of view. Ministers 
Moor and Smythe, who represented districts with large numbers of Afrikaner voters, 
supported the appointment of a judicial commission because they felt that juries would 
be swayed by their political sentiments. The other ministers considered such an 
appointment inadvisable as it would discredit the impartiality and competency of the 
judges in the Natal courts, the jingoistic public would regard it as a compromise in 
favour of the rebels, and the Natal Parliament would not pass such legislation. The 
counter-argument from Governor Hely-Hutchinson was that the failure to appoint such 
a commission in Natal might fail to secure the appointment of such a commission in the 
Cape Colony where juries were most likely to acquit rebels. The governor also drew the 
cabinet’s attention to the fact that, if the rebel trials were moved from the 
predominantly Afrikaner districts, it would not look good, and that the number of court 
cases were too numerous to be handled by the Supreme Court. These arguments, 
however, failed to sway the majority of the cabinet, and consequently the only real firm 
decision taken was for the Attorney-General to prepare legislation that would allow 
magistrate courts to try less serious rebel cases.58 At that point, it was clear that the 
majority of the Natal Government were determined to hold out against the pressure to 
have rebels tried by a commission. By doing so they believed they were entrenching 
their own sovereignty and the independence of the judiciary59 while also appeasing the 
overtly jingoistic sections of the population and the press. 
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Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Office, High Commissioner Milner and 
Governor Hely-Hutchinson all continued to put pressure on the Natal Government to 
agree to the appointment of a special commission. Eventually, on 24 April 1900, the 
Natal Government’s resistance crumbled and it agreed, in some individual cases rather 
reluctantly, to appoint a special commission to conduct the trial of rebels. This change 
of opinion took place because of the immense pressure applied to ensure that “justice 
shall be done to rebels in the other parts of South Africa” but also because the British 
Army were on the verge of starting its advance on the areas of Natal occupied by the 
Republican forces which resulted, as explained earlier, in large numbers of suspected 
rebels being apprehended. This change of mind came with one condition – the majority 
of the commissioners for the Natal Court were to be appointed from the local bench 
and bar.60 This insistence caused a problem for it was suggested that British judges 
were to be employed as members of the commission. Again, despite claims that British 
judges were not acquainted with the procedure of law in Natal, that they had no 
knowledge of African customs and habits, and that it was a negative reflection on the 
impartiality and capacity of local judges and lawyers, the Natal Government relented 
and Sir William Smith from Britain was appointed as judge president.61 
These ideological matters dealt with, the legal planning for the implementation of 
the special commission could start.62 The special commission to try the suspected Natal 
rebels took the form of a Special Court.63 Act 14 of 1900, stipulating “to make 
provision for the better and speedier trial of persons accused of treason, and for the 
appointment of acting Judges of the Supreme Court” was passed without much trouble 
by the Natal Parliament. The Act was promulgated on 31 July 1900, and came into 
effect the next day;64 roughly two months after the military had cleared Northern Natal 
of the Boer commandoes. The publication of the Act was followed by the publication 
of supporting legislation, namely Act 15 of 1900, which would serve to indemnify 
Natal authorities and the British Army regarding actions taken during the existence of 
martial law.65 Although the now legally constituted Special Court had to try all treason 
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cases, a provision was included so as to speed up the process and to deal with minor 
treasonable offences, for trial by a magistrate without jury.66 In a radical turnabout, the 
creation of the Special Court and the accompanying legislation defining high treason 
was welcomed by the normally very critical Natal newspapers.67  
From the perspective of the Natal Government, they must have been very satisfied 
with how events turned out. As one of the smallest colonies in the British Empire, it 
had not only managed to stand up to the Colonial Office, but also to create the Special 
Court and, passing the accompanying legislation on high treason, it effectively cast 
aside the various orders and declarations earlier issued by Buller. 
The Natal Government was, however, not being idle while the negotiations for the 
special commission and the assault on the Klip River County by the military were 
under way. In fact, they staged what was tantamount to show trials to appease the 
public and the press and to show the military and imperial authorities that they had the 
legal and administrative ability to deal with the suspected rebels. In the process, the 
Supreme Court of Natal and the Zululand High Court convicted four and two Natal 
Afrikaners respectively of high treason under Law No. 3 of 1868 in June 1900.68 
The Special Court inherited the legacy of the police work done by the military 
roughly five months earlier. The blanket arrest of suspected rebels by the military 
without any validation or evidence seriously hampered the investigations by the Natal 
Police and made it difficult to obtain depositions against the suspected rebels.69 As a 
result, the severely stretched Natal Police struggled. Inspector Clarke of the Natal 
Police provided a context to this legacy: “The persecution of rebels will be a lengthy 
business and very expensive … I am sorry we cannot make more rapid progress with 
the work but I have been working 15 or 16 hours every day ...”70 
This inevitably meant that an already elaborate process became bogged down. On 
18 October 1900, a worried Attorney-General Bale complained that the number of 
suspected rebels against whom no evidence had been obtained was unduly large. He 
also felt that it would be unfair to keep the men in prison for a period exceeding three 
months without any evidence against them. Bale was, however, also under political and 
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public pressure to speed up the proceedings. At the same time he was afraid that a 
critical Special Court would order the release of the suspects if steps were not 
immediately taken to justify their arrests.71 Bale consequently set a process in motion 
that could deal with the legacy of the arrests undertaken by the military. He doubled the 
number of assistant magistrates in the Klip River County, paid the clerks of the peace 
overtime, and had the details of the suspected rebels in custody forwarded to their 
home districts for investigation.72  
However, a major problem faced by the police was that the military had earlier 
moved large numbers of suspected rebels from the Klip River County to prisons in 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban. The preliminary examinations could therefore not start 
until these suspected rebels were returned to the prisons in their home districts. What 
made matters worse was that these prisons were already overcrowded with more 
suspects arriving every day. 73 The overcrowded prisons, the arrival of summer together 
with the slim chance of prospective evidence being unearthed convinced Henry Bale 
that bail should be granted to the imprisoned suspected rebels.74 Granting bail to 
suspected rebels however soon turned into a conflict between the Natal Government 
and the military. From the side of the military, the General Officer Commanding 
(hereafter GOC) for Natal, Lt-Gen Hildyard, had no objection to bail as long as the 
suspects did not reside in the Northern Natal districts affected by war.75  
Soon afterwards, 30 suspected rebels released on bail were allowed, on the orders 
of the Attorney-General, to return to their farms in the Klip River County.76 From his 
side, Prime Minister Hime denied that the Natal Government had ever directly or 
indirectly authorised the return of suspected rebels to any area, which the military had 
not sanctioned. This denial settled the matter for Hildyard and the military sent a clear 
signal to the civil authorities – under martial law they had to decide who goes where – 
regardless of the concerns of the Natal authorities.77 This hard line offended Attorney-
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General Bale for Hildyard’s order was not communicated to the Natal Government 
directly while the decision could have a serious impact on the conditions of bail bonds 
agreed to by the Special Court. Although Bale conceded that the military could, under 
martial law, remove the suspected rebels on bail to any place they pleased, such a step 
would render all bail bond granted to suspected rebels inoperative. Bale thus suggested 
that the military require the men in question to report to some officer on a daily basis. 
The Natal Government therefore spelt out their position clearly to the military:  
… it is very undesirable that there should be any apparent conflict 
between the Military and Civil Power. Your action will probably 
occasion the Government considerable inconvenience and may 
interfere with the administration of justice, which is the duty of both 
Departments to secure. 78 
The military, represented by Lt-Col Sim, offered an uncompromising military 
solution – the suspected rebels in question could be arrested under martial law if they 
were residing in an area without military consent. He also reiterated the military policy 
on the matter – no suspected rebel on bail is allowed to live north of Estcourt. 
Although the emphasis fell on men on bail, the military soon extended this order to all 
dubious Afrikaners, including convicted rebels who had served their sentences or who 
had paid their fines. All in all the military won the day and the Natal Police were 
instructed to facilitate the removal of the Afrikaners in question to the south of 
Estcourt.79 
Although it was not their primary task, the military continued to assist the Natal 
authorities in rounding up suspected rebels, particularly those who had fled to the 
Republics.80 However, cooperation between the Natal authorities and the military 
regarding suspected rebels who fell into the latter’s hands was not always amicable.81 A 
group of 20 suspected rebels who surrendered to the military in the Vryheid District 
were a point in case. Suspects like these benefited from the fact that a lengthy period of 
time had elapsed since the Boer occupation of the Klip River County and that witnesses 
could in the meantime have forgotten what had transpired, or may have left the area. 
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The burden of proof therefore shifted to military witnesses during the time of arrest or 
surrender. Attorney-General Bale for this reason requested the military to secure 
witnesses who could testify whether the suspects had actually committed high 
treason.82 With the assistance of the GOC Natal, orders were issued instructing officers 
to gather evidence on the spot when Natal rebels were apprehended. The names of 
witnesses who could testify about the circumstances under which the capture or 
surrender took place and whether the rebel carried arms, were to be especially noted. 
To assist the military in this process, the Natal Government from their side, forwarded 
lists with the names of suspected rebels unaccounted for to the Provost Marshal and 
military governor in Pretoria and the superintendents of concentration camps in the two 
Republics.83 
It is difficult to determine the success of the orders issued by the GOC for the 
transfer of suspected Natal rebels from the military to the Natal authorities did not 
happen swiftly and the process was invariably accompanied by lengthy 
correspondence.84 On another level, namely calling witnesses related to the military to 
testify against suspected rebels, the relations between the Natal and military authorities 
were also strained. At times, both the defence and the prosecution had to trace military 
witnesses to give evidence. However, locating military witnesses and getting them to 
testify proved a laborious task that did not always meet with satisfaction, for example 
the difficulty in getting two members of the Volunteer Composite Regiment to testify 
against BG Meyer. Their commander, Colonel Evans, stated that his unit was under 
orders to move at an hour’s notice and that they could be away from their base at 
Dundee for up to a month. Under these circumstances he could not grant the men leave 
to remain behind. The only option left to the civil authorities was to postpone the case 
until the witnesses were available. As a result, the case against Meyer only took place 
in March 1902, four months after the initial request was made.85 This was not a unique 
incident as the military generally proved to be an unreliable and indifferent partner in 
the prosecution of Natal rebels, resulting in the newly appointed Attorney-General, GA 
de R Labistour, having to request the newly appointed Governor, HE McCallum, to 
pressurise the army to secure military witnesses.86 The apathy of the military in 
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providing witnesses could in all probability be blamed on the fact that, unlike in the 
Cape Colony, they were not trying the Natal rebels but had to hand them over to the 
civil authorities thereby leaving them without a vested interest in the legal process.87 
Proof of this can be found in the fact that the military failed to apply martial law 
harshly where suspected Natal Afrikaner rebels were concerned, and in the end only 
seven were tried after the Boer occupation of Northern Natal had ended. Three of these, 
all of Dundee, were arrested for unpunctuality in reporting themselves and 
reprimanded.88 The other four rebels, who had already served sentences for high 
treason, were arrested on 22 November 1901 for being at the Pietermaritzburg Station 
without passes. They were handed over to the Natal authorities who fined each man, £1 
or 10 days’ imprisonment. The fines were paid the same day.89  
Against the background of the aforementioned, it would be fair to say that the 
relationship between the Natal and military authorities, as far as prosecuting suspected 
rebels was concerned, was a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Despite this, the 
Special Court sat on 11 occasions between 16 September 1900 and 14 March 1902,90 
and dealt with 596 individual cases. In total, 94% of all Natal rebels convicted of high 
treason were dealt with by the Special Court and magistrates. In April 1902, the Special 
Court was dissolved and the remaining cases were remitted to a special magistrate for 
trial.91 However, an estimated 363 suspected rebels were still unaccounted for and little 
impact was made by the Natal authorities in apprehending them after this date. This 
was the case not only because of the time that had elapsed since the Boer occupation, 
but also because the rebels in question had managed to blend into the Boer 
commandoes.92 
Understandably then, by early 1902, with the British Army having a stranglehold 
on the Boer commandoes and the Natal Government feeling the same about their 
prosecution of the rebels, several Natal politicians were beginning to question the value 
of the continuation of martial law.93 This thinking was provided impetus by the military 
withdrawing from regions such as Greytown and Kranskop and handing over 
administration to the magistrates and Natal Police. To the relief of Prime Minister 
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Hime, the overzealous ministers did not pursue the matter further and martial law 
remained.94  
Employing the Military Courts to deal with the remaining rebels 
Rather than scrapping martial law, a sentiment of using the military more 
effectively in the judicial process against the rebels started to take root. In October 
1901, the commandant of Durban, Colonel O’Neill, proposed that Natal rebels be tried 
by Military Court rather than by the costly and time-consuming Special Court. Support 
for this idea came from Governor HE McCallum, who claimed that the public felt 
likewise. McCallum’s canvassing for a change in the system was based on two reasons: 
the “easy life in prison” experienced by the sentenced rebels, and the fact that the 
suspected rebels still in the field had had ample opportunity to surrender, but chose not 
to do so and should therefore be banished to “convict establishments.” McCallum’s 
hard-line did not please the Natal Government who argued in favour of their creation, 
the Special Court.95  
Governor McCallum, however, did not let the affair rest and raised the matter of 
how best to deal with the 300 plus suspected Natal rebels still in the field with High 
Commissioner Alfred Milner during the latter’s visit to the Colony.96 When the latter 
adopted the same point of view as the Natal Government, McCallum decided to 
influence the process more directly. In conversation with the President of the Special 
Court, he took the opportunity to hint that “considering the heavy sentences which 
were now being passed by Military Courts in the Cape Colony, it would not be out of 
place if a somewhat greater severity characterised the sentences in this Colony.”97 As a 
result, McCallum had the satisfaction to report that his interference had resulted in 
heavier sentences being passed on at least two rebels.98  
The mind of the Natal Government regarding the trying of suspected rebels 
apprehended outside the Colony by Military Court was changed by a single incident. 
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Four suspected rebels, captured near Barberton, were handed over to the Natal 
authorities in July and August 1901. On 29 November 1901, the Natal CIO telegraphed 
the Provost Marshal asking if evidence could be supplied by the military against these 
men. The military’s response was curt:  
Evidence cannot now be produced and, as there was no doubt as to the 
Burghership of the men, it will be best instead of wasting more time to 
give them the benefit of the doubt and send them away as prisoners of 
war. 99  
In the meantime, the preliminary examination against the four had taken place and 
their cases were postponed awaiting the military evidence. The matter was eventually 
referred to the Attorney-General with the request that further investigations be 
suspended so that the four suspects could be deported, as suggested by the military.100  
The bungling of the evidence in the above-mentioned case moved the issue of rebel 
trials from the political to the legal sphere. Attorney-General CA de R Labistour 
suggested pragmatically to Prime Minister Hime that the military should try all Natal 
suspected rebels caught or surrendering outside the Colony by court martial since this 
might prove easier than securing evidence from the military. The Natal Government 
adopted this suggestion without any resistance and approached Lord Kitchener via the 
office of Governor McCallum with the proposal. Kitchener agreed on condition that a 
“Bill of Indemnity” was passed to protect the military. The Natal Government acceded 
and subsequently passed Act No. 35 of 1902, which safeguarded the military against 
any post-war prosecution by rebels. Kitchener then, without delay, issued an order on 
10 January 1902, informing officers that such trials could only take place with 
reference to the army head quarters.101  
When prompted, Prime Minister Hime revealed the real reasons for capitulating 
and accepting a military justice approach towards the suspected rebels not yet 
apprehended. It had become increasingly difficult to obtain evidence because of the 
lapse of time. In addition, it was expensive to maintain the cumbersome Special Court, 
and the ruling that allowed the military to try suspected rebels by court martial would 
enable the Special Court to wind up its affairs and allow members of the court to return 
to their ordinary civil duties.102 Although not acknowledged by Hime, the Natal 
Government cleverly used the military to dispense justice to rebels where the Special 
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Court, as a Natal Government creation, could not reach administratively and legally. 
The decision to allow the military to try suspected rebels arrested outside Natal 
effectively ended the protection the authorities gave their Afrikaner subjects against 
martial law. From the side of the military, Lt-Gen N Lyttelton, the GOC for Natal, 
suggested to Lord Kitchener, “if they really wanted to come in they will get 
comparatively lenient sentences”.103 With this Kitchener concurred on condition that 
the suspected rebels were only guilty of rebellion. Lyttelton was, however, warned 
against issuing precise statements of possible punishment without consultation with the 
army headquarters.104 
The comparatively lenient sentences Lyttelton hinted at proved to be false as 
several Natal Afrikaners soon found out. JC Boshoff of Newcastle, the first rebel to be 
sentenced under the new arrangement, was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and 
a fine of £100 or a further six months in prison. Suspected rebels subsequently arrested 
received even harsher sentences. On 13 February 1902, a Military Court in Standerton 
sentenced three rebels to six years’ imprisonment each. In the process, IM Kok became 
the first Natal rebel to be sentenced to death for having two soft-nosed expanding 
bullets in his bandolier. Lord Kitchener eventually commuted his death sentence to a 
prison sentence.105 Another rebel, PJ Meyer, received an equally harsh sentence of five 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of £2 000 or a further three years’ imprisonment from a 
Military Court sitting at Volksrust.106 All in all, the Military Courts convicted 15 Natal 
rebels, or 4% of the total number convicted of high treason, dishing out average 
sentences of four years and four months each. These sentences were generally much 
harsher than those passed by the Special Court.107  
Once the war had ended, Attorney-General Labistour moved swiftly to end the trial 
of rebels by Military Court, especially after the army, in violation of the order that they 
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had to try rebels outside of Natal, brought three suspected rebels to Newcastle to be 
tried. By 9 September 1902, the trial of Natal rebels by Military Court had ceased and 
the seven untried prisoners were handed over to the Natal authorities to be tried by 
magistrates under the rules of the Special Court.108 This brought the cooperation and 
conflict between the Natal Government and the British Army on legal matters related to 
Natal rebel trials to a close. 
Conclusion  
The legal dealings surrounding the Natal rebels were a mammoth undertaking for 
the Natal Government who could, with good reason, take satisfaction in their 
achievement. With a small but competent and dedicated group of officials at the helm, 
they managed to defend the political autonomy of the Colony against the Imperial 
authorities, negotiated principles along which they wanted to dispense justice to 
suspected Natal rebels, generally pleased the jingoistic and prejudiced public and press, 
and by and large stood firm in numerous differences with the military on how the legal 
processes involving the rebels should unfold. At the same time they managed to 
maintain an independent stance on judging their subjects on their own terms despite 
being subservient to martial law. 
For the British Army, on the other hand, the primary task was to win the war 
against the two Boer Republics. This revolved largely around military actions of which 
dispensing justice to rebels by means of martial law and though Military Courts was 
only one of the minor duties to be performed. In this process, conflict and cooperation 
with a small but very pushy Colony arose. A prime reason for this lies in the difference 
in organisational cultures the groups represented. While the civil authorities generally 
applied a transparent version of the law when dealing with the Natal rebels, the military 
could legitimately use their position of power under martial law not only to achieve 
quick legal solutions involving the rebels, but also to keep the Natal authorities at 
arm’s length.  
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